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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
MICHAEL WARD, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
CAROLINE COATS GRAYDON, 
Defendant and Appellee, 
and PETER COATS, 
Defendant and Cross-Appellant.. 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE CAROLINE COATS GRAYDON 
JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal by Plaintiff Michael Ward ("Ward") from the August 17,2009 Order 
on Summary Judgment Motions and Judgment, and a cross-appeal by Defendant Peter Coats 
("Coats") from the same order, as well as the District Court's denial of Coats' motions under 
Utah R. Civ. P. 59 and 60. Jurisdiction to hear this appeal is conferred on the Utah Court of 
Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103, and Utah R. App. P. 3(a). 
Appellate No. 20090714-CA 
District Court No. 080903379 
1 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND 
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
Issue on Appeal No. 1: Does a cotenant of real estate owe a fiduciary duty to 
another cotenant to sell his interest in real estate, where there is no independent basis for a 
confidential or fiduciary relationship between the cotenants? 
Standard of Review: This issue presents a question of law, which is reviewed under 
a correctness standard, and the trial court's decision is given no deference. State v. Pena, 869 
P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994). 
Issue on Appeal No. 2: Does a cotenant have a claim for damages against a 
cotenant or a third party for refusal to participate in a sale of property, or are the cotenant's 
rights and remedies limited to those available under the partition statute'? 
Standard of Review: This issue presents a question of law, which is reviewed under 
a correctness standard, and the trial court's decision is given no deference. State v. Pena, 869 
P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994). 
Issue on Appeal No. 3: Where ex-spouses remain parties to a divorce proceeding 
involving property settlement issues, does the ex-wife owe a fiduciary duty to her ex-
husband's cotenant if the ex-wife has been granted authority to act as attorney-in-fact for the 
ex-husband with respect to the property? 
Standard of Review: This issue presents a question of law, which is reviewed under 
a correctness standard, and the trial court's decision is given no deference. State v. Pena, 869 
P.2d 932,936 (Utah 1994). 
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Issue on Appeal No. 4: Where a cotenant voluntarily subordinates or subjects his 
interest in real estate to the effect of a trust deed at the time of a trustee's sale, may the 
cotenant assert a claim for damages allegedly arising from a cotenant's (or the cotenant's ex-
spouse's) previous failure to cooperate in a sale of the land? 
Standard of Review: This issue presents a question of law, which is reviewed under 
a correctness standard, and the trial court's decision is given no deference. State v. Pena, 869 
P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994). 
Issue on Appeal No, 5: If the Court finds that Ward has set forth a legal claim 
against Gray don, was the District Court correct in denying Ward's motion for summary 
judgment due to contested issues of material fact? 
Standard of Review: When an appellate court reviews a district court's grant of 
summary judgment, the court should "view the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn 
therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party," while the district court's legal 
conclusions and ultimate grant or denial of summary judgment are reviewed for correctness, 
Fericks v. Lucy Ann Soffe Trust, 2004 UT 85, ^ [2,100 P.3d 1200; View Condo. Owners Assn. 
v. MSICO, LLC, 2005 UT 91, f 17, 127 P.3d 697. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Caroline Gray don ("Gray don") does not believe any Constitutional provisions, statutes, 
or rules are determinative or of central importance to this matter; however, Gray don maintains 
that the partition statute, Utah Code Ann. §§78B-6-1201, et seq., provides a cotenant's sole 
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and exclusive remedy, which is to bring an action to compel a sale of property held by 
cotenants. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Ward was a tenant in common with Coats with respect to an eighteen acre parcel of 
land located in South Jordan, Utah, with Ward owning an undivided 9.82% interest and Coats 
owning the remaining 90.18%. Graydon is Coats' former spouse. After a trust deed 
foreclosure of the property, Ward sued Coats and Graydon, claiming that they should have 
agreed to a sale of the land for a favorable price prior to the foreclosure sale, and that he was 
damaged by the fact that the property sold at the trustee's sale for less money. R. 1-8. 
Ward filed a motion for summary judgment against Graydon and Coats, and Graydon 
filed a motion for summary judgment against Ward. R. 62-146, 147-71, 175-268. The 
District Court granted Graydon's motion for summary judgment, denied Ward's motion 
against Graydon, and granted Ward's motion against Coats. An order was entered thereon on 
August 17,2009. R. 319-20. Coats thereafter filed motions under Utah R. Civ. P. 59 and 60, 
which were denied by order entered December 17,2009. R. 326-27,411-13. Ward appealed 
the summary judgment granted to Graydon and the denial of his motion for summary 
judgment against Graydon. R. 323-24. Coats cross-appealed the summary judgment against 
him, and the District Court's denial of his post-judgment motions. R. 414-15. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Court is asked to review rulings granting summary judgment to Gray don, on the 
one hand, and denying summary judgment to Ward, on the other hand. With respect to the 
granting of summary judgment in favor of Gray don and against Ward, the facts must be stated 
in the light most favorable to Ward. Fericks v. Lucy Ann Soffe Trust, 2004 UT 85, f 2, 100 
P.3d 1200. Similarly, with respect to the denial of Ward's motion for summary judgment 
against Gray don, the facts must be stated in the light most favorable to Gray don.1 By and 
large, Ward admitted Gray don's statement of facts for purposes of her motion for summary 
judgment; however, Gray don maintains that if Ward has posited a legal basis for recovery, 
there are nevertheless disputed issues of fact that preclude summary judgment in Ward's 
favor. 
The case involves two parcels of land located in South Jordan, Utah. The parties have 
referred to these parcels as the South Parcel (approximately twenty-two acres) and the North 
Parcel (approximately eighteen acres). R. 152 (^fl). Coats acquired an interest in the South 
Parcel in 1992 (R. 152,179-81), and an interest in the North Parcel in 1999. R. 152,183-84. 
Sa rd ' s statement of facts does not contain any citations to the record, and also 
fails to acknowledge the various disputed issues of fact that Gray don maintains precluded 
summary judgment for Ward. Ward's burden on this issue is similar to the requirement 
that an appellant marshal the evidence, yet he made no attempt whatsoever to meet his 
burden. 
5 
Coats' mother, Isabel Coats, was also a part owner of the two parcels, having owned a 9.82% 
undivided interest as a tenant in common since at least 1999.2 R. 152, 186-88. 
Gray don was formerly married to Coats. R. 153. Gray don filed a petition for divorce 
in 2001. R. 162. Gray don and Coats were divorced by a decree entered in June 2005. R. 121. 
However, the divorce proceeding remained pending for purposes of resolving property 
settlement and child custody issues. A Supplemental Decree of Divorce was entered in 
November 2008. R. 120-32. An appeal was thereafter filed by Coats and was pending at the 
time the district court ruled in this matter. See Case No. 20080992-CA. Thereafter, on 
November 27, 2009, the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal on the ground that a final, 
appealable order had not yet been entered. Id. At this moment, the divorce case, originally 
filed in 2001, is still pending in the district court. 
In connection with the divorce proceeding between Gray don and Coats, Gray don's 
legal counsel caused to be recorded a Lis Pendens, which included descriptions of the North 
and South Parcels, to give notice of the pendency of the divorce proceeding. R. 193-96, 283 
flfl). Also in the divorce case, Gray don was granted "a power of attorney to sign for Peter M. 
Coats regarding the sale o f certain parcels, including the North and South Parcels 
(hereinafter, the "POA Order"). R. 100-03,154 (f7). Coats contested the entry of the POA 
2Isabel Coats' interests were held by Isabel Coats as trustee of a Irust; however, the 
parties have typically referred to Isabel Coats individually, rather than as trustee, as the 
distinction does not appear to make any difference in this matter. 
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Order, and recorded both a lis pendens (R. 154,210-12) and a Verified Notice of Appeal (R. 
154, 214-16) setting forth his contention that the POA Order was invalid.3 
The North and South Parcels, or at least Coats' undivided interests therein, were 
subject to encumbrances executed by Coats in favor of his mother, Isabel Coats. In particular, 
the North and South Parcels were subject to a trust deed recorded in 1995 (the "1995 Trust 
Deed"), and the South Parcel was subject to a further trust deed recorded in 1999 (the "1999 
Trust Deed"). R. 153-54(15), 198-205,207-08. 
On April 19, 2005, notices of default were recorded with respect to the trust deeds in 
favor of Isabel Coats. R. 155 flJ8), 218-23. Thereafter, Isabel Coats filed a lawsuit in the 
Third District Court, Salt Lake County, alleging that she owned 100% of the North and South 
Parcels. See Isabel Coats v. Peter Coats, ^ a / . , Third Dist. Ct. Case No. 050910905. R. 155 
(Tf9). In that action, Gray don (who was named by Isabel Coats as a defendant) requested that 
the court enjoin the trustee's sale of the properties. Id. Ultimately, Gray don and Isabel Coats 
entered into a stipulation. R. 108-12,155 (^9 and 10). The stipulation required Isabel Coats' 
cooperation in the sale of the property, provided for a cancellation of the notices of default, 
and recognized Isabel Coats' ownership of an undivided 9.82% interest in both the North and 
South Parcels (thus negating Isabel Coats' claim that she owned 100% of the two parcels). 
3At the hearing on the motions for summary judgment, Ward's counsel conceded 
that no title company would be willing to insure title based on the POA Order because it 
was not a final order. R. 418 (Tr. of summary judgment hearing, July 20, 2009, at p. 28 
In. 23-24). 
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Id. The Stipulation was executed by Graydon both as attorney in fact for Coats and 
individually. Id. 
The 9.82% interest in the North and South Parcels held by Isabel Coats was conveyed 
to Ward (Isabel Coats' grandson and Coats' nephew) on December 6, 2005. R. 152-55 flflj 
2, 5, and 11), 190-91. As a result, Coats and Ward became tenants in common with respect 
to the North and South Parcels, with Coats owning an undivided 90.18% undivided interest 
and Ward owning a 9.82% undivided interest. 
On December 21,2005, Isabel Coats transferred ownership of the 1999 Trust Deed to 
various trusts controlled by David Ward, Ward's father and Coats' brother. R. 155-56 (^ f 12), 
225-26. Thereafter, foreclosure proceedings under the two trust deeds were recommenced by 
the filing of notices of default in the Spring of 2006. R. 155-56 fl[ 12). 
In the fall of 2006, Graydon filed another motion for a temporary restraining order and 
preliminary injunction to halt the foreclosure proceedings. The matter was contested in an 
evidentiary hearing on the preliminary injunction, held before Judge Medley on December 5, 
2006. Judge Medley concluded that Graydon had not presented a case adequate for the 
issuance of a preliminary injunction, and therefore dissolved the temporary restraining order 
and denied her request for a preliminary injunction. R. 156 fl[ 13). Thereafter, a foreclosure 
sale under the two trust deeds was set for February 14, 2007. R. 156 flffl 14 and 15). 
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An offer for the sale of the North Parcel was made by David Hagen on February 13, 
2007 (hereinafter, the "Hagen REPC"). R. 228-37, 286-87 (fjf 3 and 4). The scheduled 
trustee's sales were continued until March 15, 2007. R. 159 fl[ 24). 
While the Plaintiffs Complaint alleges that the offer for the North Parcel was for a 
price of $5.2 million, the Hagen REPC reflects that original offer was $5.0 million. R. 228-
37. The price was increased to $5.2 million in a counteroffer executed by Coats, Ward, and 
Hagen. R. 228-37, 286-87 flfl[ 3 and 4). The Hagen REPC identified Coats and Ward as the 
sellers, and did not identify Graydon as a seller. R. 287 fl[ 5). Para. 9 of Addendum No. 2 
(which was the counteroffer by Coats and Ward), stated as follows: 
9. This sale is subject to Caroline Graydon signing a quit claim deed to the 
buyers. 
R. 234, 287 fl[ 5). 
Graydon did not own any legal interest in the North or South Parcels at any time 
pertinent to this proceeding. Her only interest in the North Parcel was as marital property. 
R. 309-11 fl[2). Nevertheless, Graydon was agreeable to a sale of the North Parcel pursuant 
to the Hagen REPC, and was willing to remove her lis pendens on the parcel and execute such 
other documents as may have been needed for a closing, so long as the net proceeds of the 
sale (i.e., after payment of the debts and costs of the sale), attributable to Coats' interest in the 
property were placed in escrow pending a decision in the divorce action. R. 288 flf 6). 
Although there was an order in the divorce action that prohibited Coats and Graydon 
from disposing of or encumbering marital assets, Graydon had good reason to fear that Coats 
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would violate the court order if he received the proceeds of sale. This was because Coats had 
violated the court's order before, by encumbering the marital home and by placing 
encumbrances and easements against the North and South Parcels. These facts, in part, were 
the basis for POA Order entered by Judge Lewis in the divorce action. R. 311-12 fl[ 7). 
Ward indicated to both Coats and Graydon that he would accept any reasonable 
proposals for closing instructions that either of them might propose. R. 159 fl[ 23). 
The sale to Hagen did not close. R. 159 (f 24). On March 15,2007, the North Parcel 
was sold at a trustee's sale under the 1995 Trust Deed, for $3,600,000.00, with the successful 
purchasers being members of Ward's family (including a 1/18th interest to Ward). R. 142-46, 
160 flj 26). After the satisfaction of the costs of sale, attorneys' fees, interest and principal on 
both the 1995 and 1999 Trust Deeds, there were excess proceeds of $1,989,789.03. R. 117-
18,160(1|26). 
Ward received 9.82% of the excess proceeds, $195,397.28, which he credited against 
his share of the purchase price bid at the trustee's sale. R. 160 flj 27). Ward alleges that if 
the sale to Hagen had closed for $5.2 million, his share of the proceeds would have been 
$510,640.00 (which is simply 9.82% of the gross sales proceeds, without deduction for costs 
of sale, encumbrances, including the 1995 and 1999 Trust Deeds, or prorations). R. 160-61 
fl[ 28). Hence, Ward asserted that he had been damaged in the sum of $315,242.72, being the 
difference between the two sums. R. 161 fl[ 29). Ward presented no evidence, however, 
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establishing that the sale to Hagen would have closed, or was likely to have closed. R. 160-61 
(1128). 
Prior to the trustee's sale, Ward took the position that his 9.82% undivided interest in 
the parcels was not subject to the 1995 and 1999 Trust Deeds. R. 289 fl[ 8). In fact, in 
connection with other litigation between these parties, on February 20, 2007, immediately 
prior to the scheduled trustee's sale, Ward and, oddly enough, Isabel Coats and David Ward 
(the "lenders"), filed a motion for partial summary judgment (in Civil No. 050910905) 
seeking a ruling that Michael Ward's interest in the parcels was not subject to the 1995 and 
1999 Trust Deeds. R. 256-62, 290 (U 9). No ruling was ever issued on this Motion. Id. In 
Ward's motion for summary judgment in this case, he also alleged that his 9.82% interest in 
the property was not subject to the trust deeds, asserting that Coats and Isabel Coats had 
signed affidavits to that effect. R. 68 fl[ 6), 92-98. 
Notwithstanding Ward's claims that his interests in the two parcels were free and clear 
of the two trust deeds, Ward alleged in his Complaint that he agreed to subordinate his 
interests to the trust deeds. Para. 36 of the complaint states: "In order to facilitate the 
[trustee's] sale, Plaintiff [Ward] agreed that his 9.82% would be treated as junior to the two 
Trust Deeds, in order to attempt to maximize the sales proceeds." R. 7, 290 flj 10). Ward's 
receipt of a portion of the excess proceeds is consistent with his voluntary subordination of 
his 9.82% interest — had he not subordinated his interest, it would not have been foreclosed 
and he would not have been entitled to any portion of the excess proceeds. 
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On November 10, 2008, Judge Atherton entered a supplemental decree of divorce in 
the divorce case. R. 120-32,161 Of 30). The Supplemental Decree was entered against Coats 
after his pleadings were stricken in that action for his contumacious conduct. R. 161 (*f 31). 
In the Supplemental Decree, Judge Atherton found that Coats caused "prior sales to fail, 
including one for the North Parcel for $5,200,000.00." R. 125 fl[ 15), 161 flj 31). 
Accordingly, Judge Atherton awarded to Gray don an amount equal to 50% of the decrease 
in proceeds realized from the North Parcel, or $523,508.00, which sum was ordered to be paid 
when the South Parcel is sold. R. 125 flf 16), 161 fl[31). In dividing the marital property, 
Judge Atherton recognized that but for Coats' failure to cooperate in the sale, the marital 
property would have yielded additional amounts, one-half of which would have been awarded 
to Gray don. R. 125 flflf 15 and 16). 
Gray don never took any actions to restrain or prevent Plaintiff from selling the 9.82% 
interest in the property that he owned. R. 312 (f 11). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
A cotenant owes no fiduciary duty to another cotenant to join in a sale of property held 
in cotenancy. Instead, a cotenant's rights and remedies respecting a sale of the property are 
limited to those available under the partition statute. Gray don was not a cotenant of Ward, 
and owed him no duties whatsoever with respect to a sale of the North Parcel. In any event, 
Gray don acted reasonably and within her rights in protecting her legitimate interests. 
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Under the undisputed facts of this case, Ward caused the injury he complains of, since 
his interest in the North Parcel was not subject to the foreclosure until he voluntarily 
subordinated his interest at the time of the trustee's sale. Finally, even if Ward has set forth 
a legally cognizable claim, disputed issues of fact preclude summary judgment in his favor. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
A COTENANT HAS NO DUTY TO SELL REAL ESTATE. 
There is simply no authority for the proposition that a cotenant owes a fiduciary duty, 
or any duty, to another cotenant to sell his interest in property. Unless Coats had a duty to 
Ward to sell his interest in the North Parcel, Ward's claims against Gray don must fail, as they 
are purely derivative of Ward's argument that Gray don was the functional equivalent of a 
cotenant (an issue that is discussed further below). 
The existence of a relationship giving rise to fiduciary duties, and the nature and scope 
of the duties owed, depends upon the facts and circumstances of a case. See, generally, 
Gildea v. Guardian Title Co., 970 P.2d 1265 (Utah 1998). For example, the fiduciary duties 
owed by an attorney to her client necessarily differ from the duties owed by a physician to his 
patient, or by an agent to a principal. Cf Kilpatrick v. Wiley, Rein & Fielding, 909 P.2d 1283 
(Utah Ct. App. 1996); Sorensen v. Barbuto, 2008 UT 8, 177 P.3d 614; and Prince, Yeates & 
Geldzahler v. Young, 2004 UT 26,94 P.3d 179. Hence, chanting the mantra, "fiduciary duty," 
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does not enlighten the court or the parties, since the nature and existence of a fiduciary duty 
depends entirely upon the particulars. 
Ward argues that Graydon and Coats owed a fiduciary duty to sell the property, 
because, Ward maintains, a cotenant generally owes fiduciary duties to his cotenant. The case 
relied upon as authority for Ward's proposition arguably makes this statement, but it is purely 
dictum. Olwell v. Clark, 658 P.2d 585 (Utah 1982), involved adverse possession and quiet 
title claims asserted against a cotenant. The Court noted, "It is established law that co-tenants 
stand in a unique relationship of confidence and trust by reason of their community of 
interest." This general statement was followed by the comment, "Some jurisdictions, 
including Utah, have found the relationship to be a fiduciary one," citing Heiselt v. Heiselt, 
10 Utah 2d 126, 349 P.2d 175 (I960), as authority for the comment.4 In the context of the 
case, however, the Olwell court was merely reiterating the rule that it was extremely difficult 
for a cotenant to adversely possess land as against another cotenant, since the cotenant's 
possession of land will not typically be considered to be adverse to the other cotenants "unless 
the cotenancy is disavowed by acts of the most open and notorious character." Olwell v. 
Clark, 658 P.2d at 588. Those are certainly not the facts and circumstances of this case. 
4Like Olwell, Heiselt was a quiet title action by a cotenant against the other 
cotenants. In Heiselt, the court's comment about fiduciary duty was made with respect to 
a payment by one cotenant on account of an adverse claim against the "common title." 
Heiselt, 349 P.2d at 129. 
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Indeed, in the year following Olwell v. Clark, the Utah Supreme Court backed away 
from its seemingly broad pronouncement that cotenants owe each other fiduciary duties. In 
Jolley v. Corry, 671 P.2d 139, 141 (Utah 1983), the Court noted, "We have recently 
reaffirmed the special relationship of confidence and trust that exists among cotenants and 
applied it to the requirements for acquisition of title by adverse possession [citing Olwell]..." 
Then, however, the Court stated that it "need not decide whether the principles applied in the 
cited authorities and in our earlier decision in McCready v. Fredericksen, 41 Utah 388, 126 
P. 316 (1912) (cotenant and tax sale), would put one cotenant under a fiduciary duty to act for 
all cotenants in any and all circumstances." Id. In short, to the extent that Olwell v. Clark 
could be read as establishing a general fiduciary duty between cotenants, the Utah Supreme 
Court swiftly distanced itself from that reading. 
Ward cannot direct this Court to any authority for the proposition he advocates, either 
in or outside this state. The other cases cited by Ward simply do not stand for the proposition. 
Chournos v. Evona Inv. Co., 93 P.2d 450 (Utah 1939), involved a co-lessee's claim for 
specific performance of a right of first refusal in a lease agreement. The Court held that the 
co-lessee's tender of performance did not comply with the terms of the right of first refusal, 
and refused an order of specific performance. The Court also noted that had either of the two 
co-lessee's ended up with the property pursuant to the right of first refusal, the other co-lessee 
could have compelled the other cotenant to share the property so acquired. This case had 
nothing to do with the sale of property subject to a tenancy in common. Of the same ilk, 
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Holbrookv. Carter, 431 P.2d 123 (Utah 1967), and Sweeney Land Co. v. Kimball, 786 P.2d 
760 (Utah 1990), involved adverse possession claims between cotenants. Ward's citation of 
Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458 (N.Y. 1928), is even farther off the mark, as that case 
involved "joint adventurers," and not cotenants. 
Another case cited by Ward, Rio Algom Corp. v. Jimco Ltd., 618 P. 2d 497 (Utah 1980), 
supports Gray don's position, by holding that a fiduciary relationship does not arise from the 
mere fact of cotenancy. Instead, the Court stated: 
A fiduciary relationship between cotenants is usually found when one cotenant 
undertakes to act on behalf of another cotenant, or takes advantage of other cotenants, 
often in the course of acquiring paramount title or ousting other cotenants. 
Id. at 506. There are simply no facts in this matter establishing that Coats or Gray don 
undertook to act on behalf of Ward, or acquired or attempted to acquire paramount title or to 
oust other cotenants. 
If Ward wanted the property sold, his sole recourse was to file a partition action under 
Utah Code Ann. §78B-6-1201, etseq. (formerly Utah Code Ann. § 78-39-1, et seq.), and seek 
a partition by sale. The Utah Supreme Court has noted that, "Partition in this state is a 
statutory action. The right to partition and the relief that can be administered are prescribed 
and fixed by [the statute]." Larsen v. Daynes, 122 P.2d 429,430 (Utah 1942), rev Jdon rehr 'g 
on other grounds, 133 P.2d 785 (Utah 1943). The partition statute does not allow a claim for 
damages arising from a cotenant's alleged refusal to sell, nor does it create any duty to sell. 
Further, despite having owned his interest for over a year prior to the trustee's sale, and 
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having acquired his interest in the middle of his grandmother's foreclosure actions, Ward did 
not file a partition action to compel a sale. 
In short, neither Coats, as the cotenant, nor Graydon, as an alleged proxy cotenant, 
owed Ward a fiduciary duty, or any other sort of duty, to sell Coats' interest in the North 
Parcel. Accordingly, Ward's complaint fails to state a claim. 
POINT II 
GRAYDON WAS NOT A COTENANT IN THE NORTH PARCEL. 
Graydon did not own a legal interest in the North Parcel at any time material to 
Plaintiffs claims. Her interest arose solely from the fact that Coats' 90.18% interest in the 
property was marital property, and was therefore subject to an equitable division in the 
divorce action. 
Ward argues, on several grounds, that Graydon was functionally a cotenant, and should 
be held to the fiduciary duty standard he maintains is applicable to Coats. First, Ward 
suggests that Graydon was functionally a cotenant simply because she held a marital property 
interest in the North Parcel. In essence, Ward argues that Graydon's inchoate, but vested, 
interest in assets of the marriage created duties to Ward as cotenant. There is no authority for 
this concept. The Kansas case relied upon by Ward, In re Marriage of Watson, 22 P.3d 1081 
(Kan. Ct. App. 2001), involved the construction of Kansas law and the allocation of liability 
for income tax on capital gains realized on a marital asset sold prior to entry of a divorce 
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decree. The case does not support the notion that a divorcing spouse, not on title, is the 
equivalent of a cotenant, or owes any duties to the other spouse's cotenant. 
Second, Ward asserts that because Gray don had the authority to act for Coats, pursuant 
to the POA Order, she was in effect a cotenant. There are at least two infirmities in the 
argument. If Gray don acted or failed to act under the POA Order, she did so as an agent of 
Coats, since a power of attorney is merely a species of a principal-agent relationship. Actions 
by an agent within the scope of the agent's authority are, in legal contemplation, the actions 
of the principal. See 2A C.J.S. Agency §§ 344 and 353 (2003). In short, Graydon did not 
individually become a cotenant of Ward merely because the divorce court entered an order 
authorizing her to execute documents as attorney in fact for Coats. Furthermore, the POA 
Order was wholly ineffective in actually giving Graydon the power to sell and convey the 
North Parcel, a point that has been conceded by Ward. 
Third, Ward maintains that Graydon brought legal actions and otherwise acted as 
though she was an owner of the North Parcel; therefore, she should be treated as a cotenant. 
In large measure, Ward's arguments are not supported by citations to the record to support his 
factual assertions. For example, Ward asserts that Graydon sued Ward, alleging Ward 
breached his fiduciary duty to cooperate in a sale of the property. Appellant's Brief at 15. 
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Nothing in the record supports that assertion.5 Even if Ward's assertions were true, the 
allegations do not make Graydon a cotenant or impose any duties owing to Ward. 
Finally, Ward argues that since Graydon was awarded damages in the divorce case 
based upon Coats' failure to close the sale of the North Parcel prior to the foreclosure, he 
should likewise recover against Graydon. In the ultimate non sequitur, Ward maintains that 
Graydon must, therefore, have been a cotenant, because otherwise how could she have 
obtained an award against Coats? Simply put, Graydon's award on this issue was based upon 
Coats' dissipation of marital property. If Ward had been married to Coats, then perhaps he 
could assert a similar claim (against Coats). 
POINT III 
WARD CAUSED HIS OWN LOSS, IF ANY. 
Ward asserts that his 9.82% interest in the North and South Parcels was not subject to 
the trust deeds. If his interest was not subject to the trust deeds, as Ward has alleged and 
argued, then the foreclosure would not have affected his ownership, and he would have 
suffered no damages from the trustee's sale.6 Yet, Ward maintains, at the time of the trustee's 
5In the event the Court was inclined to consider matters outside of the record, the 
Court would find that in the several legal proceedings involving Ward, Coats, David 
Ward, and Isabel Coats, Graydon's affirmative claims with respect to real estate have also 
been asserted in her capacity as the attorney-in-fact of Coats. In this record, that is 
reflected in the Amended Stipulation between Graydon and Isabel Coats. R. 108-12. 
6This fact also vitiates his argument that Coats and Graydon had a fiduciary duty to 
sell the property prior to the trustee's sale, since the trustee's sale would not have affected 
Ward's ownership, but only the identity of his cotenant. 
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sale, he voluntarily subordinated his interest to the trust deeds "in order to attempt to 
maximize the sales proceeds."7 R. 7,290 fl[ 10). This tactic did not improve his position, but 
instead created the following dilemma: Either (a) Ward's interests were not in fact foreclosed, 
because there was no written instrument that subordinated his interest, and therefore his 
"agreement" to subordinate was ineffective, or (b) if Ward's agreement to subordinate was 
effective, then his unilateral and voluntary agreement to subject his interests to the trust deeds 
was the sole cause of his damages. 
A subordination agreement is subject to the statute of frauds, Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-1, 
et seq., and is not effective unless it is in writing and signed by the party to be charged 
therewith. Cf. Metrobankfor Savings v. Nat'I Community Bank, 620 A.2d 433 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. App. Div. 1993) (mortgage is an interest in real estate, so subordination must satisfy 
statute of frauds). Accordingly, notwithstanding Ward's current contention, since there was 
no instrument signed by him that established his subordination, it was not effective and the 
foreclosure did not affect his interest. Ward still owns his 9.82% interest in the North Parcel 
(and should repay Coats and Gray don the money he received from the excess proceeds of the 
trustee's sale). 
7It is difficult to fathom the basis for this decision, since at the time of the trustee's 
sale, Ward knew there would be no sale of the North Parcel for $5.2 million. If his 
interest in the property was not subject to the foreclosing lien, why did he agree to 
subordinate his interest? The only possible explanation is because his family (and Ward) 
ended up owning the North Parcel as a consequence of the trustee's sale, and perhaps 
Ward and his family thought they could both get the property and pursue a damage claim 
against Gray don. 
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Alternatively, if Ward's oral si lboi dii lation is cieei i led effective, his subordination is 
the sole cause of any loss. Ward was the sole architect of his downfall. 
POINT IV 
DISPUTED ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT PRECLUDED 
SIJMMARY JIJDGMENT TO WARD. 
If the Court otherwise concludes that Ward has asserted a legal basis for recovery 
against Gray don, summary judgment was nevertheless precluded by material issues of 
disputed fact. Ward failed generally to support his claims with citations to admissible 
evidence and, on appeal, has failed to cite to those portions of h \v ^ allegedly 
establishing the facts. In addition to numerous factual deficiencies and issues identified 
elsewhere in this brief, the following items are significant. 
• Assuming Ward's legal theory is sustained, did Gray don's actions breach any 
duty owed to W ard? "\\ ard concedes that Graydon was willing to agree to a sak . "the North 
Parcel, but asserts that her requirement that Coats' share of the proceeds of sale be escrowed 
was unreasonable. This was a reasonable condition by Graydon, particularly given Coats' 
previous behavior in violating the divorce court's prohibition on disposition or encumbering 
of assets \ccoi dii igl:> , tl t.e faih ire of the sale i i n isl be blai i led w holly on Coats If Graydon 
somehow owed a duty to Ward, that duty was not breached, as her behavior was reasonable 
under the circumstances. At the very least, whether Graydon's condition was reasonable, or 
violated any duty owed to Ward, is a disputed issue of fact. 
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• If Gray don had cooperated fully in the sale (i.e., quit-claimed the North Parcel 
to Coats and abandoned any claim to the proceeds), would the sale to Hagen have closed? 
There is no evidence to establish that the sale to Hagen would have closed. The only evidence 
presented by Ward was a signed contract, and that is insufficient to establish that Hagen had 
the wherewithal to close the deal, or that other contingencies to closing were satisfied. 
• Assuming Ward has a legal claim, what are his legitimate damages? Ward has 
presented no evidence to establish the actual amount of his damages, assuming that he is 
otherwise entitled to relief, since the Hagen REPC involved real estate brokers and 
commissions, and costs of sale. Ward admitted this defect in his memorandum below. R. 
302. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, the Court should affirm the trial court. 
DATED this 1st day of July, 2010. 
BLACKBURN & STOLL, LC 
Bryce D/Tanzer ^ 
Attorneys for Appellee Caroline Coats Gray don 
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